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Abstract. In 2001, Rivest et al. firstly introduced the concept of ring
signatures. A ring signature is a simplified group signature without any
manager. It protects the anonymity of a signer. The first scheme proposed
by Rivest et al. was based on RSA cryptosystem and certificate based
public key setting. The first ring signature scheme based on DLP was
proposed by Abe, Ohkubo, and Suzuki. Their scheme is also based on the
general certificate-based public key setting too. In 2002, Zhang and Kim
proposed a new ID-based ring signature scheme using pairings. Later Lin
and Wu proposed a more efficient ID-based ring signature scheme. Both
these schemes have some inconsistency in computational aspect.
In this paper we propose a new ID-based ring signature scheme and a
proxy ring signature scheme. Both the schemes are more efficient than
existing one. These schemes also take care of the inconsistencies in above
two schemes.
Keywords: Cryptography, Digital Signature, Ring Signature, Bilinear
pairings, ID-based.
1 Introduction
The concept of ring signature was introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman in
[?]. The ring signature allows a user from a set of possible signers to convince
the verifier that the author of the signature belongs to the set but identity of the
author is not disclosed. The ring signature may be considered to be a simplified
group signature which consists of only users without the managers. It protects
the anonymity of a signer since the verifier knows only that the signature comes
from a member of a ring, but doesn’t know exactly who the signer is. There is
no way to revoke the anonymity of the signer.
Unlike the group signature schemes the ring signature scheme requires neither
a group manager, nor a setup procedure, nor the action of non-signing members.
For signing any message m, the signer may choose random set of other possible
signers including himself, to produce a valid ring signature. This signature does
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not reveal the identity of the signer but it may be verified with this signature that
the signer belong to the possible signers set. There is no revocation manager.
This allows unconditional anonymity of signer.
Ring Signature with Proxy Signatures: The proxy signature scheme was intro-
duced by Mambo et al. in 1996. These allow a proxy signer to sign on behalf of an
original signer. After Mambo et al. many proxy signature schemes have been pro-
posed [9,10,12]. Proxy signature may be combined with other special signatures
to obtain new type of the proxy signatures. Various schemes like multi-proxy
signature scheme [8], threshold proxy signature scheme, proxy blind signature
scheme [?] etc. have been proposed.
Suppose an original signer delegates its signing capability to a number of proxy
signers, such that any proxy signer may produce a valid proxy signature for
some message m. To achieve anonymity of these proxy signers we may use ring
signatures. We, therefore, combine the idea of proxy signature with ring signature
and get a new type of signature - proxy ring signature.
In 1984, Shamir [11] introduced ID-based encryption and signature schemes to
simplify key management procedures in certificate-based public key setting. Re-
cently, many bilinear pairings based ID-based signature schemes were developed.
[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,13,14]
In this paper we propose a new ID-based ring signature scheme and also an ID-
based proxy ring signature scheme. Both schemes are more efficient than existing
schemes.
2 Overview of Ring Signatures
In this section we follow formalization proposed by Rivest et al. [?]
Definition 1. Assume that each user has a secret key Si and its corresponding
public key Pi. Let < Pr > denotes the set of possible signer where r is number
of users listed in the set. Then ring signature scheme consists of the following
algorithms –
– Ring Sign- A probabilistic algorithm which takes a message m, secret key Sk
of signer, and the possible signers set < Pr > as input and produces a ring
signature σ for the message m
– Ring Verify- A deterministic algorithm which takes a message m, the possible
signers set < Pr > and the ring signature σ as input and returns either TRUE
or FALSE.
2.1 Properties
A ring signature must satisfy the usual correctness and unforgeability property. A
fairly generated ring signature must be accepted as valid with higher probability;
and it must be infeasible for any other user to generate, except a very little
probability ǫ, a valid ring signature with the ring he does not belong to.
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Signature must be anonymous, so that no verifier should be able to guess the
actual signer’s identity with probability greater than 1
r
+ ǫ, where r is ring size
and ǫ is however small.
Since the possible signer set is randomly chosen and is not predetermined, it
should be a part of signature.
2.2 Combining Function
The concept of Ring signature is derived from an abstract concept called Com-
bining Function.
Definition 2. A combining function Ck,v(y1, y2, ..., yn) takes as input a key k,
an initialization value (also refereed as glue value) v, and an arbitrary values
y1, y2, ..., yn ∈ {0, 1}
b. It produces z ∈ {0, 1}b, such that for any fixed values
k, v, any index s and fixed value of {yi}i6=s, Ck,v is a permutation over {0, 1}
b,
when seen as a function of ys. This permutation is efficiently computable as well
as its inverse.
2.3 Rivest et al.’s Ring signature scheme
Ring signature generation: Given a message m to be signed, signer’s secret
key Sk, and the possible signers’ public keys sequence P1, P2, ..., Pr of all ring
members, the signer computes the ring signature as follows.
1. Choose a key : The signer computes, using a publicly known hash function
h
k = h(m,P1, P2, ..., Pr)
2. Pick a random glue value : The signer picks an initialization value
v∈R{0, 1}
b
3. Pick random xi’s : The signer picks an random xi for all other ring mem-
bers uniformly and independently from {0, 1}b, and computes yi = gi(xi)
.
4. Formation of ring : The signer solves the ring equation for yk:
Ck,v(y1, y2, ..., yn) = v
and using knowledge of his trapdoor he gets xk from yk.
5. Output the ring signature : The ring signature on message m is defined
to be the (2r + 1) tuple:
(P1, P2, ..., Pr; v;x1, x2, ..., xr)
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Ring signature verification: On receiving (P1, P2, ..., Pr; v;x1, x2, ..., xr) as
the ring signature on message m, the verifier can verify as follows.
1. Apply trapdoor permutation : verifier computes for each i, yi = gi(xi)
2. Key computation : computes k = h(m,P1, P2, ..., Pr)
3. Verify the ring equation : The verifier checks if
Ck,v(y1, y2, ..., yn) = v
If the ring equation is satisfied, the verifier accepts the signature as valid
otherwise rejects.
3 Bilinear Pairings
Let G1 cyclic additive group generated by P , whose order is a prime q, and G2
be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q: A bilinear pairing is a map
e : G1 ×G1 −→ G2 with the following properties:
P1: Bilinear : e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)
ab
;
P2: Non-degenerate: There exists P,Q ∈ G1 such that e(P,Q) 6= 1;
P3: Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈
G1.
When the DDHP (Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem) is easy but the CDHP
(Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem) is hard on the group G; we call G a
Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group. Such groups can be found on supersingular
elliptic curves or hyperelliptic curves over a finite field, and the bilinear parings
can be derived from the Weil or Tate pairing. [1,4,7]
4 Proposed ID-based Ring Signature Scheme (IDBRS)
Setup : Let P is a generator of G1; e : G1 ×G1 −→ G2 is a bilinear pairing.
H1 : {0, 1}
∗ −→ z∗q , H2 : {0, 1}
∗ −→ G1 and H3 : G2 −→ z
∗
q are crypto-
graphic hash functions. Key Generation Center (KGC) chooses a random num-
ber s ∈ Z∗q and sets PPub = sP . The KGC publishes the system parameters
{G1, G2, e, q, P, PPub, H1, H2} and keeps s as the master key.
Extract : An user submits its identity information IDk to KGC. KGC publishes
the public key Qk = H2(IDk) and returns Sk = sQk to the user as his/her
private key.
Ring signature generation: Given a message m to be signed, signer’s secret
key Sk, and the possible signers’ public keys sequence L = (ID1, ID2, ..., IDr)
of all ring members, the signer computes the ring signature as follows.
1. Choose a key : K = H1(m||L).
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2. Pick a random glue value : The signer picks a random A ∈ G1 and
computes the initialization value
v = ck = e(A,P )
K
3. Pick random Ti’s : The signer picks a random Ti for all other ring members
uniformly and independently from G1, and computes
ci+1 = [e(PPub, H3(ci)Qi).e(Ti, P )]
K
.
4. Formation of ring : The signer solves the ring equation for yk. when i = k,
we get
ck+1 = [e(PPub, H3(ck)Qk).e(Tk, P )]
K = v
On solving this ring equation we get
Tk = A−H3(ck)Sk
Now compute T = Σ Ti
5. Output the ring signature : The ring signature on messagem is the tuple
(L; c1, c2, ..., cr;T )
Ring signature verification: On receiving the ring signature (L; c1, c2, ..., cr;T )
on message m, the verifier can verify as follows. The verifier computes
K = H1(m||L).
and checks if
Πici = [e(PPub, Σi(H3(ci)Qi)).e(T, P )]
K
If the equation is satisfied, the verifier accepts the signature as valid otherwise
rejects.
5 Analysis of IDBRS
5.1 Correctness
From ring signature generation protocol –
ci+1 = [e(PPub, H3(ci)Qi).e(Ti, P )]
K
Πri=0ci+1 = Π
r
i=0[e(PPub, H3(ci)Qi).e(Ti, P )]
K
Πri=0ci+1 = [Π
r
i=0e(PPub, H3(ci)Qi).Π
r
i=0e(Ti, P )]
K
Πri=0ci+1 = [e(PPub, Σ
r
i=0(H3(ci)Qi)).e(Σ
r
i=0Ti, P )]
K
Πici = [e(PPub, Σi(H3(ci)Qi)).e(T, P )]
K
which hold true, since we have cr+1 = c0
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5.2 Security
The proposed ID-based ring scheme holds unconditionally signer-ambiguity, as
all Ti but Tk are taken randomly from G1: In fact, at the starting point, the Tk
is also distributed uniformly over G1, since A is randomly chosen from G1. We
fix a set of identities, denoted by L.
Suppose that A is an adversary whose identity IDA is not listed in L, but
he wants to forge a valid ring signature. A can either forge a valid signature of
a user whose identity IDk is listed in L or executes the following experiment:
1. A queries Extract qE , (qE > 0) times with known parameters and IDi,
which does not not belongs to L,for i = 1, 2, ..., qE. The query Extract
returns the qE corresponding secret key such that Si = sH2(IDi) = sQi .
2. He Chooses randomly an integer c0 ∈ Z
∗
q
3. He runs ring signature generation protocol’s third step for i = 0, 1, ..., r− 2,
where r = |L|
4. Assigns c0 = [e(PPub, H3(ck−1)Qk−1).e(Tk−1, P )]
K
5. Outputs the ring signature (L; c1, c2, ..., cr;T )
After running Step 1 of the above experiment, A gets {S1, S2, ..., SqE}, a set of
secret keys . Suppose he gets a pair (IDm, Sm) such that H2(IDm) = H2(IDj),
where IDJ ∈ L, then he can forge a valid ring signature. But since H2 is
random oracle and Extract generates random numbers with uniform distribu-
tions. This implies that A gets nothing from query results. H3 is random oracle
and all Ti are taken randomly from G1. This implies that the probability of
c0 = [e(PPub, H3(ck−1)Qk−1).e(Tk−1, P )]
K to be true is 1
q
. So we can say that
the proposed scheme is non-forgeable.
5.3 Efficiency
The proposed ring signature scheme works under the environment of supersingu-
lar elliptic curves or hyperelliptic curves. The essential operation in our ID-based
signature schemes is to compute a bilinear pairing.
We denote by P , the cost of computation a bilinear pairing, AG1 the cost of
addition in G1, MG1 cost of multiplication in G1, MG2 cost of multiplication in
G2 and cost of multiplication in Zq by MZq . The cost of hashing is denoted by
H . We shall not consider exponentiation as it can be reduced in addition in G1.
We ignore the cost of computation of H2(ID)
In our opinion both the first two schemes discussed in Table 1 are having
inconsistency in the computational procedure. As in Zhang’s scheme [13], in
initialization, ck+1 = H(L||m||e(A,P )) has been computed, which is incorrect.
H is defined in their paper as H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq. But in computation of ck+1, the
pairing e(A,P ) had used, which belongs to V (according to their notation), not to
Zq. This shows their ck+1 computation is taken incorrectly. We may remove this
inconsistency by applying a newly defined hash function as H4 : G2 → {0, 1}
∗.
If we modify their scheme’s in this way, computational cost of their scheme
An ID-based Ring Signature Scheme ... 7
Table 1. Comparison of computational cost with existing schemes.
Signature Generation Verification
Zhang’s Scheme (2n− 1)P + nH + nAG1 2nP + nH + nMG1 + nMG2
+nMG1 + (n− 1)MG2
Lin’s Scheme (2n− 1)P +H + nAG1 2P +H + (n− 1)AG1
+(2n− 1)MG1 + nMG2 +(n+ 1)MG1 + nMG2
Proposed Scheme (2n− 1)P + nH + (n+ 1)AG1 2P + (n+ 1)H + (n+ 1)AG1
+2nMG1 + (n− 1)MG2 +(n+ 1)MG1 + (n− 1)MZq +MG2
increases by a factor nH in signature phase and by a factor of nH in verification
phase. A very similar mistake is in Lin’s scheme [?] is made. In Equation 3, they
have computed ca+1 = e(A,P ). This implies that the ca+1 is an element of G2,
but they have treated it as element of Zq in equation 4 and also in equation 5.
(If P ∈ G2 and Q ∈ G1 then P.Q is not defined.). If we define a hash function
H5 : G2 → Zq, computational cost of this scheme is also increased by a factor
nH in signature generation phase and also nH in verification phase. Our scheme
does not contain such inconsistency and also is more efficient.
6 ID-based Proxy Ring Signature Scheme (IDBPRS)
6.1 Delegation Function due to Zhang et al. [14]
Here an original signer with secret key- public key pair (xo, PKo) wants to
delegate signing power to proxy signer with secret key- public key pair (xp, PKp).
System parameters are {G1, G2, e, q, P,H1, H2}. The original signer runs the
following protocol -
– The original signer prepares a warrant message consist of explicit descrip-
tion of the delegation relation. warrant message also contains some identity
information of the proxy signer.
– The original signer computes xow = xoH2(w) and sends (xow, w) to the
proxy signer.
– Proxy signer checks e(xow, P ) = e(H2(w), PKo). If it holds, he computes
then xw = xow + xpHr(w).
Above protocol can be regarded as PKGen (Proxy key generation protocol) in
proxy signature scheme. In this delegation proxy signer will use xw as secret
key and PKo + PKp as public key. Now proxy signer may use any ID-based
signcryption scheme from pairing (takes the ID public key as H2(w) and secret
key xw and the public key of trusted authority as PKo + PKp) to get proxy
signcryption scheme. Security of above protocol is discussed in [14].
7 A New Proxy Ring Signature Scheme from Pairings
[Setup] The system parameters params = {G1,G2, e, q, P,H1, H2} Let Alice
be the original signer with public key PKo = soP and private key so, and
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L = {PSi} be the set of proxy signers with public key PKpi = spiP and private
key spi .
[Proxy Key Generation] The original signer prepares a warrant w, which is
explicit description of the delegation relation. Then he sends (w, soH2(w)) to
the proxy group L. Each proxy signer uses his secret key Spi to sign the warrant
w and gets his proxy key Si = soH2(w) + spiH2(w).
[Proxy Ring Signing]For signing any messagem, the proxy signer PSi chooses
a subset L′ ⊆ L. Proxy signers’s public key is listed in L′. Now to sign he/ she
perform following operations:
– Initialization: Choose randomly an element A ∈ G1, compute
ck+1 = e(A,P ) (1)
– Generate forward ring sequence For i = k+1, k+2, ....k+(n−1) choose
randomly Ti ∈ G1 and compute
ci+1 = e(PKo + PKpi , H3(ci)H2(w))
H2(m‖L).e(T i, P ) (2)
– Forming the ring: Let Rn = Ro. Then, PSi computes
Ti = A− h2(m ‖ L)H3(ci)Si, (3)
T = Σni=1Ti (4)
– Output: Finally, Let cn = c0. The resulting ring signature for a message m
and with ring member specified by L′ is the (n+ 1)-tuple:(c1, c2, ..., cn, T )
[Verification] Given message m, its ring signature (c1, c2, ..., cn, T ), and the
set L′ of the identities of all ring members, the verifier can check the validity of
the signature by the testing if:
Πni=1ci = e(PKo + PKpi , Σ
n
i=1H3(ci)H1(w))
H2(m‖L).e(T, P ) (5)
8 Analysis
Key Secrecy In computing user Pi’s private key Si from the corresponding
public key PKo + PKPi requires the knowledge of original signer’s private key
so and proxy signer’s private key spi . According to definition these keys are
protected under the intractability of DLP in G1 as PKo = soP and PKPi =
spiP .
Signer ambiguity In a valid proxy ring signature (c1, c2, ..., cn, T ) with proxy
group L′ generated by PSi all ci’s are computed by eq 2. Since Ti ∈ G1 is chosen
uniformly at random, each ci is uniformly distributed over G2. Thus, regardless
who the actual signer is and how many ring members involved (c1, c2, ..., cn)
biases to no specific ring member. Other discussion are very similar as in previous
sections.
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9 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a new ID-based ring signature scheme from bilinear
pairings. This scheme removes deficiencies in existing schemes. In this paper we
proposed a new and a proxy ring signature scheme which, whenever proxy signer
want to sign message on behalf of the original signer provide anonymity. The
proposed scheme is more efficient than the scheme of Zhang et al.’s, especially
for the pairing operation required in the signature verification. This proxy ring
signature scheme is more efficient for those verifiers who have limited computing
power.
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